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Origins of Casino Capitalism 
When capitalism first began to emerge as the dominant economic system around the 
turn of the 19th century in Western Europe and North America, the role of the 
financial sector in the system was simple and straightforward.  When individuals or 
groups wished to set up a new company, they sold shares in the company to the 
public in order to raise the initial start-up capital.  These shares were generally 
purchased by people who had accumulated some capital from existing or previous 
business ventures – industrialists, traders, land owners and wealthy professionals.  In 
general, then, the people who owned these shares were themselves involved in 
producing and distributing goods and services – what is commonly termed “the real 
economy” nowadays.  They bought shares in the hope that they would generate a 
better return than the low deposit interest rates available from the banks, and were 
usually quite happy if the shares gave a return of 5-10%.  
 
The role of the banking system – at least in the Anglo-Saxon economic model – was 
largely confined to providing loans to firms in the form of working capital, providing 
loans to consumers to facilitate purchases, and providing foreign currency to facilitate 
international transactions.  In other words, banking existed as an adjunct to the 
economic system, with its prime function being to facilitate the smooth functioning of 
that system. 
 
Over time, however, significant changes began to take place in the way the system 
operated.  An inherent and recurring feature of capitalism is its tendency to 
accumulate capital more quickly than the ability of the underlying economy to absorb 
this capital in the form of reinvestment.  This is because of the way added value is 
distributed between profits and wages.  Because individual capitalists seek to limit 
wages in order to maximise their competitiveness, in aggregate this means a lack of 
effective demand, since workers ultimately are the main consumers of the products 
produced by capitalist firms.  Neoliberal economists argue that the economy will work 
most effectively if each individual pursues their own individual interests.  However, 
competition between capitalists inevitably leads to a tendency towards 
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overproduction of goods relative to the ability of consumers to purchase these goods 
due to downward pressure on wages and overaccumulation of capital. 
 
The welfare states which emerged in the west in the 1950s produced a useful 
antidote to this tendency by exacting high taxes on profits and wealth, the resultant 
revenues then being used to support the incomes (and therefore consumption 
capacity) of the poor, boost mass-demand public services (e.g. health and education) 
and invest in infrastructure.  In those countries where the welfare state was most 
developed (mainly Scandinavia), capitalists tended to accept the role of the state in 
maintaining demand for their products and therefore to tolerate the accompanying 
high taxation without repercussions on business vitality. 
 
In seeking outlets for the growing store of excess capital which emerged as the 19th 
century progressed, capitalists were inclined to make increasingly risky investments.  
Some of these were in the real economy, such as the railway mania which prevailed 
in the mid-to-late 19th century.  However, an increasing share tended to find its way 
into financial speculation.  This tendency was fuelled by another important change 
taking place in the way the system worked as we moved into the 20th century.  This 
was the fact that those with the excess  capital were, to a growing extent, not those 
who had earned it but those who had inherited it.  These people had little contact with 
the real economy, and began to look at investment as a kind of game.  Thus, stocks 
and shares were bought, not because this would facilitate an expansion of production 
in the real economy or would generate a steady income, but in the hopes of making a 
profit from selling the shares at a higher price. 
 
Such activities were not just confined to buying and selling company shares.  A key 
development in this respect was the creation of “futures”, where a capital value was 
put on a promise to make future payments - either one-off payments (e.g. purchasing 
a delivery of oil or wheat) or payment streams, as in bonds and bank loans.  
Speculators bought and sold these, those purchasing them hoping they might make 
a killing if, for example, the price of oil soared.  Over time, the range and complexity 
of such so-called “financial instruments” grew, and a whole industry grew up around 
such speculative investments in the form of investment bankers and dealers of 
various kinds.  As a result, a rapidly growing share of total investment activity was 
dedicated to such speculation, rather than investments in factories, mines, roads and 
offices.   
 
The British economist Susan Strange coined the term “casino capitalism” to describe 
this emerging economic system which was increasingly focused on investment 
designed to make a killing rather than expanding the productive base of the 
economy. 
Financial bubbles 
A recurring feature of financial speculation is its tendency to create financial bubbles, 
formed by excessive investment in a particular product, sector or geographical area.  
This tendency arises from another inherent feature of speculative behaviour i.e. herd 
behaviour, where followers blindly follow the lead of innovative entrepreneurs.  Being 
the first in the field, these entrepreneurs succeed in generating substantial profits 
which attracts further investors seeking to make similar profits.  This then sparks off 




and money begins to pour in.  However, where the initial investors made money from 
the inherent product which was the focus of their investment, subsequent investors 
make their money by selling stocks, shares and bonds to the next wave of investors 
– in other words, investment becomes detached from the product which sparked it off 
in the first place. 
 
Eventually, however, confidence in the sector declines, investors begin selling off 
their investments and this reproduces a second bout of herd behaviour, except in the 
opposite direction, as investors seek to get rid of their holdings before they lose 
further value – thereby guaranteeing that this is exactly what will happen.  In 
essence, the bubble gets so inflated that it simply bursts or, to use another analogy, 
the stampede of the herd is only halted when the entire herd jumps over a cliff.  We 
have yet another example here of how individual behaviour by capitalists has the 
effect of generating mass destruction for all. 
The globalisation of casino capitalism 
Up to the 1970s, most advanced capitalist economies were largely self-contained, so 
that the effects of financial bubbles tended to be contained within national 
boundaries.  The 1970s saw a major economic downturn in the advanced 
economies, as the long period of economic prosperity ushered in at the end of the 
Second World War finally petered out.  This downturn presented a massive problem 
for the huge store of capital which had built up over the previous thirty years, and the 
desire to find outlets for this capital was a key driving force behind the globalisation 
process which began in that decade.  Thus, currency exchange controls and 
restrictions on the international movement of capital were lifted, with speculation in 
currency itself becoming a major feature of casino capitalism.  Central to all of this 
was the USA, by far the world’s largest economy, with the dollar being the currency 
in which most international capital movements were transacted. 
 
Boosted by the advent of new information technology, capital became hypermobile, 
with vast flows of money moving around the world virtually every minute of the day.  
This has had the effect of moving financial bubbles onto the global stage with the 
after-effects of burst bubbles also being felt all around the world.  However, with 
national governments everywhere showing a willingness to bail out distressed 
investors, usually on the grounds of protecting the integrity of the banking system, 
the main victims of burst bubbles tended to be the little people who got caught up in 
the webs of capital flows upon which the bubbles are built. 
 
A couple of figures will help to give some idea of the extent to which the real 
economy has become a sideline to the economy of international finance.  In 2002, 
global sales of goods and services amounted to $32 trillion (trillion = 1,000 million) 
while sales of foreign exchange and financial derivatives amounted to over $1000 
trillion, of which only $8 trillion were related to financing international trade.  Less 
than 2% of foreign exchange transactions are related to international trade of goods 
and services.  The other 98% are related to currency speculation. 
The current economic crisis 
This brings us then to our account of the most recent bubble whose demise has 
reduced the Irish economy to the status of an economic basket case.  In the USA, 




heels of another bubble, the notorious dot.com bubble of the late 1990s, which 
involved a massive surge of investment in companies set up to provide various 
services on the Internet.  Most of these companies never made any profit at all, and 
when the plug was finally pulled in the year 2000, a sharp economic downturn 
ensued, mainly because the IT hardware sector had ramped itself up in anticipation 
of a major surge in demand for computers and related technologies, and now found 
itself with major spare capacity on its hands. 
 
Such was the rapidity with which the dot.com bubble was followed by the subprime 
mortgage bubble that the transition has been referred to in some quarters as the 
“great bubble swap”.  In fact, there were significant links between the two.  In an 
attempt to boost economic investment following the dot.com downturn, the US 
Federal Reserve Bank began a series of interest rate cuts which saw the prime 
lending rate fall from 6% in January 2001 to just 1% in June 2003.  This in turn set off 
a surge in mortgage borrowing as householders sought to make maximum use of the 
cheap credit available. 
 
A second important contributory factor in the subprime bubble was the creation of 
complex new financial instruments which, among other things, allowed banks and 
other lending institutions to circumvent government regulations regarding the balance 
between deposits and loans, and between liabilities and capital assets.  These new 
instruments combined risky subprime mortgages with more reliable mortgages in 
composite packages, with the idea that the sound performance of the more reliable 
mortgages would more than offset any defaults in the subprime sector.  These 
packages were then sold off to speculators and became part of the merry-go-round 
of casino capitalism. 
 
Armed with these new instruments, and desperate for possible outlets for their 
excess capital, banks and other lending institutions rather recklessly pursued 
potential mortgagees, offering 100% mortgages, frequently with an initial 3-5 year 
moratorium on the payment of interest and/or repayment of capital.  As is typical of 
financial bubbles, the ensuing investment frenzy became a self-fulfilling spiral.  
Growing demand for mortgages drove the price of houses up, so that those who 
purchased houses quickly found themselves with positive equity as the value of their 
houses surpassed the nominal value of their mortgages.  This in turn had the effect 
of attracting further mortgage applicants, driving the spiral higher and higher.  The 
availability of finance to feed this investment frenzy was greatly boosted by a major 
inflow of foreign capital into the US mortgage market – in the first five years of the 
decade, an estimated $1 trillion flowed into this market from abroad, mainly from 
China and the oil-exporting countries. 
 
The housing bubble in turn had the effect of creating a spin-off consumer boom, as 
householders with rapidly appreciating assets remortgaged their properties to finance 
refurbishments, the purchase of second homes, purchases of cars and consumer 
durables, etc.  By the end of 2005, mortgage debt in the USA was the equivalent of 
70% of GDP – an extremely high level. 
 
The growing demand for housing and the associated consumer boom began to make 
itself felt by 2005 in the form of rising inflation, to which the Federal Reserve Bank 




the mortgage market.  The rate of uptake of new mortgages slowed down as 
potential customers were put off by the higher interest rates.  This immediately had 
the effect of putting a brake on the rate of growth in house prices.  More importantly, 
many mortgage holders, faced with higher repayments, simply defaulted.  The fact 
that many of them did not have to put a penny of their own money into their house 
purchases, and in many cases had never had to pay back principal, made it easy for 
them to default.  With repossessed houses being sold off cheaply, house prices 
began to fall, creating a situation of negative equity for many more mortgage holders, 
setting off a further round of defaults.  Thus, the spiral of constantly rising house 
prices which had driven the investment bubble was now put into reverse, as falling 
house prices accelerated the rate of default leading to further falls in prices. 
 
The banks and other financial institutions which had bought up the complex 
packages of mixed mortgages were now faced with a dilemma, as it was next to 
impossible to predict how these packages would perform.  Their basic reaction was 
to simply hoard their assets as a protection against defaulting packages and refuse 
to lend out any money to anyone, thus sending the economy into its worst recession 
since the 1930s.  This recessionary situation has been further exacerbated by a fall-
off in consumer spending.  Rising mortage repayment costs means that mortgage 
holders have less money to spend on consumption.  Consumers are also inclined to 
hoard whatever money they have in the expectation that things are going to get 
worse and it is important to set money aside for the impending rainy day – thereby in 
effect ensuring that things will, in fact, get worse.  Furthermore, with prices falling, 
consumers are inclined to hold off spending in anticipation of further price falls. 
The US government has responded to the crisis by propping up the banks with cash 
and pumping vast amounts of additional funds into the economy in an attempt to 
boost consumption and thereby investment, but thus far to limited effect. 
 
Given the extent to which the US economy is intertwined with the rest of the world, 
the spinoff effects of the US crisis have been felt globally.  Stung by their experiences 
with investing in the USA, and concerned about the prospect of further bank defaults, 
institutions with spare capital have become very cautious about lending money to 
anyone, leading to a credit crisis.  The retreat of the US economy has also impacted 
on those countries – of which there are many – for which the US is an important 
export market.  The sharp decline of the American dollar has also made it more 
expensive to export to that country.  In many countries, the negative impact of the US 
recession has been further exacerbated by the fact that they had engaged in their 
own financial bubble, following the lead set by the USA – the United Kingdom being a 
good case in point. 
The economic crisis in Ireland 
This brings us, finally, to a brief review of the crisis as it has unfolded in Ireland.  
There has been some debate on the extent to which the crisis here can be attributed 
to external events, or to which it was self-inflicted.  As the most globalised country in 
the world, Ireland was always going to be negatively affected by the global downturn 
which followed the collapse of the US bubble.  In particular, the USA is Ireland’s 
largest export market, taking 20% of total merchandise exports in 2007.  In addition, 
other export markets have been hit by the globalisation of the post-bubble downturn. 
However, to suggest, as the so-called Financial Regulator did when the recession 




entirely due to external events was simply outrageous.  Thankfully, this individual 
was relieved of his post shortly after making this assertion.  The fact is that Ireland 
has been much more heavily impacted by the recession than other European 
countries, and the reason for this is the complete disarray into which our banking 
system has fallen due to its own reckless dealings in the internal property market. 
In one sense, Ireland was unfortunate with the timing of its own bubble, which 
coincided with that of the USA – although this is in no way to excuse the 
irresponsible behaviour of the Irish banks in financing the bubble, and the dereliction 
of duty on the part of the Irish government which not only did not exercise any 
meaningful regulatory supervision over the banks, but in fact fanned the flames with 
its own expansionary policies. 
 
Ireland’s own property boom accelerated gradually through the 1990s on the back of 
the massive expansion of the domestic economy in this period.  With the build-up of 
confidence in the economy and the growth of earnings and savings, potential home-
owners were increasingly inclined to take the plunge and purchase their own house 
as the new decade unfolded.   As in the USA, they were further prompted in this 
direction by historically low interest rates and the increasing availability of 100% 
mortgages.  Rapidly rising house prices themselves acted as a stimulus to purchase, 
as potential buyers sought to get into the market before prices rose further, happy in 
the expectation that further price rises would quickly put them into a position of 
positive equity.  These were all classic symptoms of bubble behaviour. 
 
We will never know what exactly would have happened to the Irish bubble had the 
American bubble not burst first.  However, it was obvious to most observers for 
several years that the level of investment in Irish property was unsustainable and a 
collapse was certain to come sooner or later. 
Conclusion 
We are now faced with the very painful task of trying to clear up the mess created by 
the unholy alliance of the Irish banks and property developers, and we are far from 
reassured that the very government whose incompetence and venality led us into the 
mess in the first place is now charged with the burden of getting us out of it.  In the 
Appendix below we offer some views on what a progressive approach to handling the 
crisis might look like.  Meanwhile, we finish the main section of this paper with two 
extracts from recent issues of of the American socialist journal, Monthly Review.  
While composed with particular reference to the crisis as it has unfolded in the USA, 
these extracts provide some salutary lessons for us here in Ireland, and some 
pointers to the likely consequences of the current course of action being followed by 
the Irish government.  These extracts have been slightly rewritten in the interests of 
compositional clarity. 
 
The first extract is from an article by John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff entitled 
“Financial implosion and stagnation” in the December 2008 issue: 
 
“Who will pay to get us out of the mess?  In the past, it is those at the lower end of 
the social spectrum who have always borne the bulk of the costs of economic crises.  
If this is repeated, it means that the old game of privatization of profit and 
socialisation of losses will be replayed for the umpteenth time.  The population will be 




public to see through this deception will depend on an enormous amount of 
education by trade union and social movement activists.   
 
“It is important to discount any attempts to present the current crisis as a kind of 
“natural disaster”.  The cause of the crisis lies in the system itself.  Those at the top of 
the economy have been the main beneficiaries of the system, shamelessly enriching 
themselves at the expense of the rest of the population.  They should be held 
responsible for the main burdens now imposed on society.  It is the well-to-do who 
should foot the bill, not only for reasons of elementary justice, but also because they 
collectively and their system constitute the reason that things are as bad as they 
are…There should be no golden parachutes for the capitalist class paid for at 
taxpayer expense”. 
 
The second extract is taken from the editorial in the March 2009 issue: 
 
“The current proposal being pushed by the US Treasury is to create a so-called “bad” 
bank under government ownership that will buy up the toxic wastes from the private 
financial sector…thus socialising the losses without nationalising the banks 
themselves.  The secret of this gigantic fraud needs to be exposed.  The whole 
operation…requires that a vast gift of public funds be handed over to the care and 
custody of the obscenely rich incompetents who helped engineer the catastrophe in 
the first place.  The nature of the salvage operation would thus most likely require 




APPENDIX: A progressive proposal for dealing with Ireland’s economic crisis. 
 
We need a sober analysis of what brought the current crisis about, and we need to 
draw up a plan to prevent a recurrence. 
 
In this respect, what we do not need are short-term measures which only paper over 
the cracks in the system.  We have tried to show here that the kind of crisis which we 
are now experiencing is not a once-off affair due to a conjuncture of unusual 
circumstances, but a recurring and inherent feature of the way the capitalist system 
works.  It is a systemic problem which requires a systemic response. 
 
The crisis was not caused by trade unions, the public service or the level of public 
spending, which is quite low by international standards.  Furthermore, a recent report 
by the National Competitiveness Council concluded that the productivity of the Irish 
public sector is favourable by international standards.  A lot of commentators have 
seized on the current crisis to pursue old hoary agendas. 
 
At national level, we need much more effective leadership than we have got from the 
present government.  We need to get across-the-board agreement on what needs to 
be done, and a commitment to supporting the agreed recovery programme from all 
stakeholders and interest groups.   
 
We need a national forum of experts (not just economists) to advise the government 




We need a comprehensive plan for national recovery and development with clear 
strategies, priorities, and targets – not the kind of piecemeal approach to reforms and 
savings which An Bord Snip and the Commission on Taxation represent.   
 
We should press for a pan-EU approach to dealing with the crisis, rather than each 
member state doing its own thing, leading inevitably to clashing policies.  As a fragile 
economy which has been most badly hit, Ireland has a lot to gain from making 
recovery an EU-wide project.   
 
EU structural funding should be expanded, partly in order to act as a stimulatory 
mechanism for expanding demand and employment, but also to focus member states 
on supporting investment in key areas such as green technology and knowledge-
based economic sectors.   
 
The European Central Bank should support member states by purchasing bonds 
issued by their banks and governments while also implementing an EU-level bank 
surveillance and regulatory system.   
 
In the medium to long term, the EU should promote greated economic cooperation 
between member states with a view to avoiding wasteful forms of competition and 
supporting a coordinated approach to the development and application of new 
technologies. 
 
In this context, trade unions and left-leading political groupings should take the lead 
in campaigning for reconstituting/strengthening the welfare state as a means of 
combatting the build-up of excess capital and maintaining effective demand for the 
products of the private sector.  The view that high taxes are a deterrent to economic 
activity – presented as axiomatic by neoliberal economists – needs to be challenged.  
High taxes in the Scandinavian welfare states go side by side with business vigour 
which sees all these countries appearing among the wealthiest in the planet. 
 
Ultimately, the crisis is a global crisis, and we need to build global-level and effective 
governance structures to reform the system to prevent a recurrence. 
 
At home in Ireland, the current crisis and the widespread public anger to which it has 
given rise provides an historical opportunity to ask profound questions about the 
nature of the economy and of Irish society which has left us in the mess in which we 
now find ourselves.  It is clear that a political system based on petty localism does 
not provide us with the kind of political leadership required of a modern globalised 
economy.  It is also clear that a “planning” system founded on corruption and 
speculation is simply unable to deliver affordable housing, a sustainable transport 
infrastructure and adequate community services.  Progressive elements should seize 
the moment and take the leadership in calling for a new vision for Irish society, rather 
than a band-aid approach to patching up our current difficulties without putting in 
place systems and structures which can prevent a recurrence of these difficulties.   
 
Among the key elements of this new vision should be the following: 
 
Priority must be given to meeting ordinary people’s basic needs: food, housing, 




Unemployed people should be employed creatively in community and environmental 
work at a small payment above the dole 
 
Empty housing should be purchased by the government at knockdown prices to 
provide social housing. 
 
A single and unified national pension and health insurance scheme should be 
introduced. 
 
The elimination of speculative investment in land development in order to create a 
planning system based on community need. 
 
Implementation basic reforms to create a responsible banking system capable of 
supporting broad sustainable development in Ireland. 
 
The delivery of most day-to-day public services (including health, education, social 
welfare and community facilities) should be transferred from central to local 
government, partly in order to increase efficiency of delivery, partly in order to 
strengthen the status of local government and enhance local democracy and partly in 
order to focus national parliament on national-level policy formulation and 
implementation.  The current political system is dysfunctional and incapable of 
rational, smart or long-term decision-making. 
 
 
 
